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Resale price maintenance is the marketing policy under which 
the manufacturer or owner of a commodity, identified by brand, trademark, 
trade name, copyright, or patent, places restrictions on the price at 
which that commodity shall be sold by purchasers and subpurchasers.* By 
definition, therefore, resale price maintenance is concerned only with 
goods which are identified and generally among those considered as con-
sumers' goods. Goods may be identified by either manufacturers or mid-
dlemen, but it is manufacturers who are usually involved. Furthermore, 
it is concerned with the prices charged by purchasers and subpurchasers, 
normally jobbers and retailers, who buy the goods outright. 
The history of resale price maintenance as a marketing policy 
provides the basis for its discussion. Its broad outlines can be briefly 
stated. In order to strengthen their position in the market, many manu-
facturers have developed means for distinguishing their products by brand, 
trade-mark, or trade name. Such identification, combined with the continu-
ous production of a satisfactory product and effective marketir~, has en-
abled some of these manufacturers to build a widespread and relatively 
constant demand for their products. 
It is at this point that these manufacturers met a new difficulty 
and an important problem in publi~ policy emerged. Many retailers soon 
saw in these well-known, branded products an opportunity to make a strong 
appeal to consumers on a price basis. By selling well-kr~own products at 
a lower price than was· customary, they could realize on the good will at-
* 23, PP• 2 
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tached to the manufacturer's brand and thereby attract trade to their 
stores. This has been done in varying d~grees. Some stores have used a 
' 
:few such products as "leaders n either to give them the impression that 
all their prices were law, or simply as a device to induce buyers to come 
to their store. other stores :follow a policy o:f selling all or a large 
proportion o:f its products, includir~ those which are identified, at 
prices lower than those charged by the majority o:f their competitors. As 
a result, many manufacturers have :found that, although the identi:fication 
o:f their products has to some extent limited direct price competition 
with other manufacturers or similar products, the cut-price policies o:f 
some o:f the middlemen to whom they sell involves them in price competition 
among dealers. Those dealers who cannot meet the low prices o:f their 
competitors, or do not wish to meet them, :frequently complain to the manu-
:facturer and ask him to prevent price cutting in the sale o:f his product. 
The question o:f legalizing resale price maintenance began to 
assume importance as a result o:f a series o:f adverse Supreme Court decisions. 
In a decision concerrdng the practice as carried out by the Dr. Miles 
Medical Company handed down in 1911, the Supreme Court held that an agree-
ment between a manufacturer and his jobbers and retailers to maintain 
prices on his products was illegal.# Only i:f a manufacturer retained 
title to his goods could he maintain resale prices without subjecting 
himsel:f to legal di:f:ficulties. 
The :first real e:fforts to legalize the practice began in 1914 
with an attempt to have a federal law passed. Finding it impossible to 
pass a :federal act, interested merchants and manufacturers turned to the 
states, and in 1931 the retail druggists of Califorrda sponsored and 
#Dr. M21es Medical Company v. Park, 220 u.s. 373 
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succeeded in obtaining the enactment o£ the £irst statute legalizing re-
sale price maintenance within state boundaries. Since that time, similar 
acts have been passed in 45 states. 
While the United States Supreme Court held such state acts as 
being constitutior~l, it held that similar contracts to maintain resale 
prices in interstate commerce to be illegal. Because o£ these unfavorable 
decisions concerning-the practice when it involved interstate commerce, 
manu£acturers located in one state continued to £ear that i£ they took 
advantage o£ the resale price maintenance laws o£ other states the court 
might hold that this operation was in interstate commerce. To cope With 
this situation, ren~red pressure was brought on Congress ar~ the Miller-
Tydings Act was passed in 1937 .# It took the £orm o£ an amendment to 
the Sherman Act of 1890, thereby permitting manu£acturers·in one state 
to make contracts under resale price maintenance law in other states 
without violating the Sherman Act. The Millar-Tydings Act exempts £rom 
the anti-trust laws: 
contracts or agreements prescribing minimum price 
£or the resale o£ a commodity which bears, or the 
label or container o£ which bears, the trade mark, 
brand, or name o£ the producer or distributor o£ 
such commodity and which is in £ree and open compe-
tition with commodities o£ the same general class 
produced or distributed to others when contracts or 
agreements o£ that description are law£ul (in the 
state of resale). 
An express provision, however, excludes nhorizontal11 agreements between 
businesses 0 in competition with each other". The amendment did not ex-
pressly include the rrnon-signer" clause included in some state er~ctments 
:f/!rhe bill was opposed by the administration and probably could not have 
passed on its merits. At the last moment, however, it was made a rider 
to the District o£ Columbia appropriation bill. Since Congress was draw-
ing to a close and the District needed the money, the lawwas passed and 
President Roosevelt signed it. 
-~-- -~----~ 
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which bound all distributors to observe the resale price agreed upon by 
any one buyer. Because the Supreme Court in 1951 showed the ttnon-signern 
clause to be unprotected by the Millar-Tydings Act, it was supplemented 
in 1952 by the McGuire Act. The McGuire Act, as an additior.t.al provision 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, specified resale price maintenance 
to be effective against all distributors, signers and non-signers alike. 
In 1953 the constitutionality of the McGuire Act was upheld by a u.s. 
Court of Appeals. 
It is not the purpose of this discussion to consider in apy 
detail the legal aspects of either the federal or state laws on fair 
trade legislation. To my mind, the legal aspects of resale price mainten-
ance are secondary to their implication as an expression of a social-
economic climate of the times. Beyor.d this, resale price maintenance 
has been and will continue to be predicated on its principle aim of help-
ing the small retailer compete with chain stores and other large outlets 
qy inhibiting what is considered unfair price cutting. 
My interest in resale price maintenance as a topic for discus-
sion arose in my rather extensive contact with the trades that have been 
most involved in its application. For a period of a year, in the course 
of the work I was doing at the time, I walked into hundreds of drug, hard-
ware, liquor and food stores. My first introduction to the subject of re-
sale price maintenance arose, appropriately enough, in a drug store. This 
druggis~s concern was a real one. He maintained that he would be forced 
out of business should fair trade be repealed. It was here that I became 
first interested in the problem and for the remainder of my time where my 
wor~ brought me in contact with retail merchants I brought the subject up 
for discussion. 
Significantly enough, it was the druggists who had the most to 
say about resale price maintenance and, as we shall see, it has been the 
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•drug industry that has been the most active proponent o£ resale price 
maintenance. Food store operators were little concerned with resale 
price maintenance since they were not a££ected by its application £or 
the most part. Only the hardware stores carryir€ sports equipment and 
electrical appliances bad an opir.d.on to express and since they were 
small operators they were in sympathy with resale price maintenance. 
r 
The same was true o£ ~quor store operators who £elt they were getting 
the :icib.g 'along "With the cake itself. I£ they could not sell price 
maintained liquor they bad private brands o£ equal quality they could 
sell at a cheaper price. 
It will be seen that my approach to this topic has been 
super£icial wi tb respect to any statistical data Which would substan-
tiate or contest the various views expressed by £actions in this con-
troversy. For the most part, such data is non-existent except £or 
studies which were made over ten years ago by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion in their Report on Resale Price Maintenance.* This data bas not 
been utilized inasmuch as it is easily accessible to the reader should 
he £eel that it· would have acy validity in the present economy. My 
approach, for the most part, is a practical one o£ necessity as well 
as design. The £oregoing study o£ the Federal Trade Commission, while 
valuable, bas obviously been utilized in the most limited £asbion since 
its conclusions do not provide a basis £ar discussion in the present 
consideration £or repeal o£ £air trade. 
To a limited extent I have made reference to some £airly re-
cent studies on price comparisons although these studies certainly do 
not provide su££icient basis £or judgments. Resale price maintenance 
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~is a practical subject which should, to my mind, be considered irt refer-
ence to the problem it has sought to solve. Its effects carillot be meas-
ured in terms of statistical data but rather in terms of its more obvious 
impact on the character of retail selling. Resale price maintenance has 
been responsible for a new trend in retail marketing. The question is 
how radical these changes are and whether it is still an effective reme-
dial approach to the problem of price cutting in light of these trends. 
Fair trade was proposed and adopted for the express purpose 
of equalizing the competitive conditions of some of the factors involved 
on the marketing scene. It is the purpose of this discussion to attempt 
to determine to what extent it has achieved this objective. It will 
cover the attitudes of the various factions that are concerned with re-
sale price maintenance as well as the extent of its applications within 
the various trades. · The total effects of resale price maintenance on 
the marketing scene will probably never really be known although I have 
attempted to relate the more obvious results of its application. I have 
looked behind resale price maintenance at the problems that have arisen 
due to national brand advertisir€ characteristic of those manufacturers 
who have subscribed to resale price maintenance. The attempt here is 
to show that the protection needed by small merchants, as a result of 
consumer conditior~ng, against loss-leader merchan~sing is necessary 
whether through maintained prices or minimum mark-up laws. The discus-
sion will cover the rise of the discount house and the change it has 
promoted since its advent. Finally, we will look at the problems in-
volved in resale price maintenance and how these problems effect its 
future. 
Resale price mainter~nce has suffered some major setbacks in 
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the past year and indications portend its tenuous future. Nevertheless, 
its significance is, and will continue to be, in the precedent it has 
established, the impact of which can only be realized by studying the 
role it plays qn the marketir~ scene. 
ll 
I ATTITUDES CONCERNING RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
A. The Manufacturer 
Interestingly~ few manufacturers took an active part in secur-
ing passage of resale price maintenance laws in the various states. After 
passage, hmvever, it was contingent on each manufacturer to decide what 
action, if any, he would take to maintain the resale price on his pro-
duct. Some of the dealers to whom the manufacturer may sell his product 
may favor price maintenance, or even insist upon it, while others feel 
that it is a disadvantage to them and may refuse to handle the manufac-
turer's products if the,dealer cannot set his awn prices. As has been 
indicated, however~ it is likely to be the small dealers who favor the 
maintenance of prices and the large dealers who oppose it. In many 
cases~ then~ the manufacturer must decide whether it is to his advantage 
to maintain prices and attempt to keep his smaller dealers satisfied~ or 
to permit price cutting and thus foster the trade of the large price-
cutting stores regardless of the attitude of his smaller customers. 
Three fundamental solutions are usually available. If his 
difficulty seems to arise from the fact that price concessions have 
been made to the price-cutting merchants~ the manufacturer may merely 
decide to eliminate these concessions but not resort to price mainten-
ance. On the other hand~ whether he allows price concessions or not~ 
he may attempt to maintain resale price. Finally~ he may decide to do 
nothing. 
Since price cutters are frequently quantity buyers it is quite 
likely that the manufacturer has allowed price concessions to them. 
Even though these concessions may be warranted because of reduced costs 
of marketing or production, they encourage price cutting. If this is 
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the case, he may attempt to restrain the practice either by raising his 
price to the price cutters or by lowering it to others. He car~ lower 
his prices to the complaining dealers to the level paid by the price 
cutters, but this will reduce his average profit margin per unit of 
sales. Furthermore there will be no assurance that the smaller dealers 
will increase their sales enough to offset this reduction. Under either 
policy, sales of those dealers who formerly cut prices are quite likely 
to declir~ because their price advantage has been elimirJCLted and the 
sales by others may not increase even though they now pay the same 
prices. 
The elimiration of price differentials will not necessarily 
eliminate price cutting. As previously pointed out, many large retail-
ers carry on their operations at lower costs than do many of their 
smaller competitors, and they frequently operate on some form of mini-
mum-service basis which eliminates some of the costs connnon to their 
service competitors. Also, large retailers often use well-known branded 
products as leaders, even though this makes it necessary to sell such 
products at prices which realize no profit or an actual loss. 
If the manufacturerf3 problem cannot be solved by eliminating 
price differentials, or if he does not wish to elimirJCLte concessions to 
his larger customers, he may decide to maintain resale prices. He may, 
of c01I'Se, decide both to eliminate the former differentials and to 
maintain prices. If price maintenance is successful, it will prevent 
the sale of his product below the maintained price. Following this 
policy may help him to retair~ or increase the patronage of the small 
dealers, who might be driven from the field by price cutting. In any 
event, the small dealers would probably make no effective effort to sell 
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his product or may make definite attempts to sell substitutes rather 
than sell the products in competition with the price cutters. 
If sales to smaller dealers increase appreciably, even though 
he may lose some or all of his large customers, he may feel that this is 
an §.dvantage to him since a market composed of a large nwnber of small 
dealers may be more certain than one composed of a few large dealers. 
In addition, he may not wish to have the public gain the impression 
that his products can be profitably sold at less than the regular price. 
1. Disadvantages Faced By Manufacturer: 
The dilemna facing the manufacturer becomes more apparant 
should he choose to abide by maintained prices. The biggest problem 
will be caused by the dissatisfaction amor€ his former price cutters. 
Their purchases are likely to decline, and they may even refuse to 
purchase his product. While this would be serious amor€ the small deal-
ers, it is even more so among the large retailers. In a number of 
fields large stores that operate on a cut-price basis account for a 
large proportion of all retail sales of a manufacturerts products. Not 
infrequently one large retailer actively pushing the sale of a product 
at a lower price than that charged by his smaller competitors will sell 
more than all of those competitors combined. Moreover, it may be less 
expensive for the manufacturer to sell to a few large customers than to 
maintain a market composed of a large number of small stores. If sales 
· to large buyers fall off, the manufacturer can maintain his former volume 
only by increasing sales to small customers. But the smaller dealer for 
whom the prices are maintained may take his new policy for granted and 
make no special efforts to sell the product in larger volume. If this 
happens, the manufacturer may find it necessary to increase his efforts 
to sell them and he may fir~ it necessary to increase his consumer ad-
vertising. 
A further difficulty, and one which will be covered later on 
in this study, involves that fact that the burden of enforcement of the 
policy of resale maintenance falls primarily on the manufacturer. In 
some states or sections of the country the manufacturer may feel more 
inclined to emphasize enforcement while in other states he will do 
nothing, either because price cutting is not a problem in those states, 
or because price-cutting retailers are more important to him than are 
those who object. In other cases, he must decide to what lengths he 
'Will go in enforcing his declared policy. Some stores may be too small 
to bother with while others teo important to antagor.dze. 
B. The Middleman 
Wholesalers have not taken so definite a part in the price 
maintenance controversy as have manufacturers and retailers. Insofar 
as they handle their own branded merchandise they may favor price main-
tenance, but since prices may be quite easily maintained in selling to 
retailers with whom they are likely to cooperate closely, they have 
little use for the protection a statute might give. 
They often favor price maintenance, however, because they 
feel it hampers the competition of manufacturers' brands with their awn. 
Also, those jobbers who are in a precarious position in the trade wel-
come fixed prices, since they hope that such prices will both benefit 
their retailer customers and carry a wholesale margin which will help 
their own profit status. The main reason wholesalers are prone to favor 
price maintenance is their dependence on the small independent retailer. 
With the constant growth of large scale retailing establishments on the 
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one hand, and the growth in direct selling qy manufacturers o~ the other, 
jobbers find that competition within the wholesale trade is growing more 
intense. In this respect, price mainter~nce has become increasir~ly im-
portant to the wholesaler. It is a case of what helps the small ir.de-
pendent retailer also helps them. 
c. The Retailer's Point of View 
· It is obvious from the foregoing that the majority of small 
retailers are in support of maintained prices.* It was the pressure 
exercised by retailers that gave impetus to fair trade proposals and 
it is through this group's militant efforts that fair trade has survived 
over these twenty-five years. While the manufacturer has borne the major 
burden in the imposition of maintained prices, the manufacturer as we 
will see, has been the tool in the hands of the retailers. It is true 
that the manufacturer has considerable interest in protectir~ his good-
will as manifested by his patents and trademarks, but his interest is a 
small one compared to the ir.dependent retailer. 
1. The Problem of ''Ur.tfair" Competition 
In essence, retailers, and I speak here of the independent 
retailers, in general, desire to have manufacturers maintain prices in 
order to avoid the cut-price competition of other retailers, particularly 
the large chain retailers. The advent of large scale retail organizations 
which more or less contir~ously sold all, or many, of their products at 
prices below those charged by small competitors has made it difficult 
for the latter to continue in busir~ss. The sale of goods at low prices 
is not cor.tfined to large stores but it is the large stores, particularly 
the chain stores, supermarkets, and large mail-order houses, whose com-
* For exceptions to this, see 1 
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petition has been felt keer~y by small merchants. 
A reduction in the price of a well known product may great~ 
increase sales in the price-cuttir~ stores. With ir~tial success, this 
policy of price cutting could be continued to the degree that competition 
in the area would be forced to go out of business. 
The problem of what actually constitutes ur~air competition 
has been argued at great ler~th. It is a subject which has so many 
ramifications that an attempt to cover it in a cursory fashion would be 
of little value. Even though competition is the life blood of the 
American economy, "in 67 years no group of lawmakers has been able to 
define it•"* If we carwot define competition, how can a law be designed 
as a protection against ur~air competition? To the small merchant price-
cutting is a form of unfair competition even though to the large mer-
chant this is merely keen competition. Economists, on the other hand, 
have withdrawn from the controversy by formulating theories of pure and 
perfect competition but have yet to contribute any workable means of ap-
plyir~ these theories in terms of measurir~ when competition becomes un-
fair and vice-versa. The courts have been similarly remiss in contrib-
uting anything concrete to our understandir~ of the problem. In fact, 
they have·cor~used matters one step further; monopoly they agree, under 
the anti-trust laws, is a threat to competition, yet, what constitutes 
monopoly? Is it merely "bigness"? Is it monopoly, or unfair competition 
when a practice is in restraint of trade? How much restraint of trade 
is necessary to be in "restraint of tradeff? And so on it goes, as much 
of an er~gma today as it ever was. 
For purposes of this paper, resale price maintenance must be 
* 4, PP• 29 
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assumed to be a measure with the objective o£ protectir~ the small mer-
chant in order that the £ormer can "compete" £or customers with the lat-
ter •. The small merchant says it is ur£air'to take advantage o£ a brand 
r~me and use it to draw customers into a store by o££ering the brand-
named product at cost or less, merely to get customers into the store. 
They £eel this to be ur~air because they have not the £ir~ncial reserve 
to do likewise. By establishir~ a minimum price below which no merchant 
may sell a particular brand named product, every retailer, theoretically, 
whether big or small, has an equal chance o£ attracting the buying 
public. 
The consumer would naturally seek out those stores whose 
prices are lowest, and, i£ carried to extremes and over a prolor~ed 
period, it is not improbable that retail trade would be concentrated 
in the stores o£ a £righter~ng few chain or mail order organizations. 
At this stage, preventative means would have to be taken in order to 
protect the consumer from ncooperative" e££orts between chains to main-
tain prices presumably at ur~easor~bly high levels. Such an eventuality 
might result from too much or too free a competition thereby creating a 
condition no less evil than no competition at all. Resale price main-
ter~nce could be considered one method of maintainir~ the happy medium. 
D. Price Maintenance and the Public 
Opponents o£ resale price maintenance argue that maintained 
prices will be high prices so as to make possible higher profits to 
manufacturer, jobber, and retailer. The importance of this contention 
is prone to be overemphasized as we will see further on. While it is 
true that prices will be lower in price-cutting stores, maintained 
prices, in the absence of monopoly or of extreme pressure from retailers, 
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must be set by the manufacturer with a view to the prices of competir~ 
products, many of which will not have their prices maintained. The manu-
facturer must also consider the strer~th of consumer's demand for his 
products and the possibility of substitution. The manufacturer canr1ot, 
therefore, set prices higher than competition and consumer demand will 
warrant. In the absence of severe competition, whether the price is 
fixed or not, the pries of a product would undoubtedly ter~ to be fixed 
at a level which would er~ble all dealers, except the most inefficient, 
to make a profit. On the other hand, the manufacturer might feel that 
sales at a low price will result in a greater volume·than he can attain 
by maintainir~ a higher price that will accommodate only higher cost 
dealers. If the latter are small and relatively urdmportant, he may 
decide to ignore the~ and establish a price based solely on aonsidera-
tion of his low-cost dealers. In fact, in many lines, the grocery trade, 
for example, he cannot ignore cash-and-carry chains and other low cost 
operators. This policy is, in fact, being tried out in some states by 
a few manufacturers of food products.* 
1. Availability of Non-Price Fixed Products 
Since maintained prices make it impossible for low-cost mer-
chants ~o sell at the low prices their lower expenses warrant, they are 
likely to spend the surplus in push.ing other brands or in improving 
their service. If dealer competition turns to competition in services, 
valid objection can be raised. The development of minimum-service, low 
cost stores has been welcomed as a means of affordir~ lower prices to 
consumers who are willing to forego service. To my mir~, it would be 
~~ 3, For a critical ar~lysis of the reasons militating against the suc-
cess of resale price maintenance in the food ir~ustry, see Chap. v. 
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unreasonable that dealers whose costs are law, either because of reduced 
service or of greater efficiency, should be denied the use of price ap-
peal ar~ that the consumer should not receive the price advantage which 
results1 
~ere is no evidence at the present time that any large pro-
portion of goods sold at retail are, or will be, sold at maintair~d 
prices. The majority of consumers spend a large part of their income 
for food. But with the exception of a few manufacturers who are experi-
mentir~ on a very limited basis, price maintenance has not been under-
taken in the grocery field, perhaps because of the prevalence of chain 
store brands and the heavy policir~ job involved in watchir~ thousands 
of small retail grocers, as well as the lack of trade association efforts. 
Fresh fruits and vegetables do not come under the acts, and neither do 
most fresh meats. Items subject to fashion changes have not been brought 
• 
under the acts and it is difficult to see how they could be. The pro-
ducts already mentioned, on which prices are.not generally maintained, 
and automobiles on which maintained prices are usually cut by trade-in 
allowances, cover a considerable portion of goods sold at retail. 
The lines in which the greatest amount of resale price mainten-
ance is not found are drugs, cosmetics, toilet goods, books, statior~ry 
supplies, liquor, cigars and photographic supplies, and the majority of 
consumers sper~ but a small part of their income for such products. 
The absence of any concerted effort on the part of the public 
during the period when the McGuire Act was under consideration indicates 
neither approval or disapproval of resale price maintenance. Any opin-
ions that are expressed by the public would, for the most part, be ex-
pected to be reflections of opinions gathered from the newspapers or 
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friends actively participating in the fair trade controversy. On issues 
such as fair trade the public generally displays an apathy unless they 
are so grossly affected as to raise their ire. 
In the case of resale price mainter~nce it could be generalized 
that very few people know enough about it to express a logical opirdon. 
While the price issue has been the main emphasis of opponents of resale 
price maintenance, so little proof is available to substantiate their 
claims that the public has not taken an active interest. Probably the 
main reason the public has not raised its collective voiee is due to the 
availability of products that are price maintained at discount prices. 
In short, while the public might miss "loss leaders" at their favorite 
stores, most people are probably not aware of their sigr~ficance as re-
lated to resale price maintenance. They are aware that, in most instances, 
private brand aspirin is less expensive than the r~tionally advertised 
brands and they can make their choice between the two on the basis of 
whether they think the latter type is worth the extra cost. The fact 
that resale price mainter~nce has continued to achieve the active support 
of so many manufacturers must indicate that the public continues to buy 
their products and that resale price mainter~nce has not been to their 
detriment. More important, retailers would hard~ subscribe to an un-
popular public cause. 
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II THE EXTENT OF APPLICATION OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
One of the most amazir~ aspects of the fair trade subject is 
the fact that only three states, Vermont, Missouri and Texas, ·as well 
as the District of Columbia, origir~lly failed to pass laws on price 
mainter~nce. At first glance, it would appear from this that fair trade 
legislation continues to be as highly controverted today as it was twenty-
five years ago. To my mind, this controversy is out of proportion to 
the extent of its application. It seems evident that resale price main-
tenance will not be extended to cover any greater part of the total vol-
ume of retail trade. Astoundir~ly, in spite of the importance it has 
assumed, price maintained products, it is estimated, comprise orJy 5 to 
10 percent of the total volume of retail trade.ifo 
A. Food Trade 
In the food trade relatively little active support was given 
resale price mainter~nce in its incipient stages. Support for resale 
price maintenance legislation found expression mainly through the 
National Association of Retail Grocers and its monthly journal, National 
Grocers Bulletin as well as some state and local retail grocerst a.ssocia-
tions. Their support took the form of publicizing and endorsing the 
' 
various price maintenance bills as they arose in the states and Federal 
Government. Support of wholesale grocers was scattered although no 
active opposition was offered. 
It was probably realized at the time that resale price main-
tenance was not applicable to a. large proportion of food products. In 
the first place, it was considered impractical by manufacturers or pro-
ducers because of the large number of competitive unbranded items on 
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the market. Second, many items of branded, packaged goods have a tendency 
to fluctuate in market price with the cost of raw materials of which they 
are made, or with the market prices of substitute items. Third, in recent 
years independent grocers have found it easier to compete with chain 
supermarkets by joining cooperative wholesalir.g groups and thereby gain-
ir~ advantage of quantity discounts and cheaper private brands. 
Efforts to get manufacturers of grocery products to place 
trade-marked items under resale price maintenance contracts have had 
little success except in Ohio. This state was selected by the National 
Association of Retail Grocers as a "test" state in order to ascertain 
the results of maintained prices in the food trade. Actually, it is 
questior~ble that any valid conclusions were drawn ir~smuch as only a 
very small number of natior~l brands were price maintained. Manufacturers 
who did place their products under resale price maintenance chose relative-
ly low mirJUnum prices based on the price range charged by their large 
volume outlets such as supermarket chB.i.ns. It was obvious they could 
ill afford to price themselves out of the market by setting a price higher 
than their unbrar~ed competitors. The lack of persor~l service in a 
self-service market makes it difficult to ffpush" products as we will see 
can be done in a drug store. Thus, unlike the drug trade, the success 
of price maintenance in the food trade can never be important. Without 
concerted effort on the part of retailers to show mar!ufacturers the ad-
vantage they can gain by way of increased sales, manufacturers would 
have no reason to limit their competitive positions. 
B. Liquor Trade 
Resale price maintenance in the liquor trade While prevalent 
is not too important in this discussion. While liquor is a necessity 
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in many cases, it would, for practical purposes, be classified as a 
luxury. In this respect, the effects of resale price maintenance on 
the trade cannot be taken with the same seriousness as in the food and 
drug trades. 
Manufacturers in the liquor ~rade, for the most part, have 
succumbed to pressures from retailers to maintain prices on the more 
popular identified brands of liquor. Competition from private brands 
apparently is no problem since most of the distillers market liquor 
with private labels of either the manufacturer or the wholesaler. While 
this liquor might be ~dentical to the nationally advertised brand, its 
price would be left to the discretion of the retailer. On the other 
hand, some distillers even control the resale prices of private label 
goods packaged for large retailers when such liquor would come into 
competition with their r~tionally advertised brands. Much to the cor~ 
sterr~tion of the small retailer, the large retailers most often do not 
abide by the miriUnum prices stipulated by the distiller. Distillers 
have gone one step further in protectir~ their tavern 9wner customers by 
setting a minimum price on a "by the drink" basis. 
While resale price mainter~nce continues to be taken seriously 
in the liquor trade, its effect is of little consequence for those not 
adverse to drinking private brands. These brands would either be the 
product of distillers in this country or from England. Er~lish distillers 
have made no attempt to suggest a resale price nor have their American 
distributors. Further, in seventeen states liquor, wine included, can 
be sold only through state or country operated stores. Resale price 
mainter~nce would in these cases, of course, not apply. 
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No figures are available as to the extent of application of 
maintained prices in the beer and wine industry; however; estimates 
indicate it is not very great. Local retailers in some parts of the 
country have actually set the price of local beers as per price list. 
This forces distributors into accepting the suggested prices. It would 
appear that resale price maintenance in this industry is applied where 
competition is minimal for the particular section. Local brewers often 
corner the local market and must succumb to retailer pressures if they 
are to continue to dominate that area.* · 
It can be seen again that in fields whe·re the competition is 
keen and where unbranded products are in competition with branded items 
or where a great many branded items are in competition with other 'tranded 
items, the result .is that few of them will resort to maintair.ed prices. 
c. Tobacco Trade 
Resale price maintenance in the tobacco trade illustrates 
another situation, where competition within a trade is not the only 
prohibitive factor in the applicability of maintained prices. While 
cigars are fairly uniformly price maintained, cigarettes, on the other 
hand, are not. In the case of cigars, prices are ordinarily advertised 
by the marlufacturers or indicated on the package of packaged cigars. 
Possibly for this reason or for another less apparant reason most brands 
of cigars are price maintained. It might be explained by the fact that 
relatively few chain orgardzations carry cigars and for this reason 
problems or enforcement are not as acute. 
Cigarettes are not price mai~tained because of the difficulty 
of admirdstration and erlforcement of price policies. In addition to 
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wholesalers and retailers who specialize in the sale of cigarettes, such 
products are handled by a large number of wholesalers and many thousands 
of retailers, the cigarette sales of which comprise but a small part of 
their total business. The latter group, handling a substantial propor-
tion of the manufacturersr output, has been accustomed to sellir~ these 
fast movir€ tobacco products at a lower mark-up than that customarily 
received by strict~ tobacco distributors, thus complicatir~ the manu-
facturers' problem in setting equitable margins ur~er resale price main-
tenance. The very existence of such a large number of dealers of diverse 
types, many wr.i. th but ar~ incidental interest in the sale of tobacco pro-
ducts, has made it difficult to organize them for. purposes of promoting 
resale price mainter~nce. Finally, chain stores, particularly supermar-
kets, account for a very large percentage of cigarette sales. Their 
large volume sales coupled with the small interest displayed by the many 
· independent dealers has left the manufacturers fairly free of pressures. 
Interestingly too, manufacturers have not placed much importance 
on resale price mainter~nce. Although a competitive trade, the manufac-
turer of the many brands is concentrated among a relatively few compar~es. 
While attempts have been made in some states to maintain prices by agree-
ment between wholesalers and retailers, such agreements have been con-
sidered collusive by the courts and thereby held illegal. 
D. Hardware Trade 
Resale price maintenance in the hardware trade has made little 
progress, and, in terms of volume of sales covered is of little conse-
quence. This is indicated by the fact that, of the large number of 
manufacturers makir€ branded hardware items, relatively few placed pro-
ducts ur~er resale price maintenance contracts. The trade marked or 
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branded hardware articles that are usually sold under resale price 
maintenance contracts are mostly specialty items ~uch as sportir~ goods, 
electrical appliances, fishing equipment, kitchen wares and electrical 
goods such as electric shavers, clocks and the like. Articles of hard-
ware to which resale price maintenance is not applicable are those 
articles with no particular identity or those involvir~ trade-ins. As 
in the case of the latter, of which automobiles are most conspicuous, 
the practical difficulty of determir~ng the true value of a trade-in 
furnished a means of evadir~ the minimum resale price whenever desired 
on products so covered. This practice has done much to discourage the 
adoption of resale price maintenance qy other manufacturers of products 
usually involving trade-in when sold at retail. 
The National Retail Hardware Association is the central orgar~­
zation that represents the hardware industry. The attitude of this or-
ganization toward resale price maintenance has been favorable but due 
to the difference of opir~on amor~ its members, its support has been 
cor~ined to editorial opir~on in hardware trade journals. 
E. Drug Trade 
One of the principal objectives of the National Association 
of Retail Druggists from its organization in 1898 has been to obtain 
for retail druggists a margin of not less than 33 1/3 per cent on the 
selling price, equivalent to a 50 per cent mark-up on cost on all pro-
ducts sold in drug stores. This avowed objective was undoubtedly the 
motivatir€.factor for the Associationts being in the forefront in the 
fight for the passage of the state and Federal fair trade laws. 
1. Pressures Exerted on Manufacturers 
Pressure on manufacturers has come principally from retail 
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druggists either individually or through their state and local trade 
associations and "fair trade" committees. These groups have been joined 
by wholesalers and their trade orgardzations. Among the methods used 
to bring pressure to bear on manufacturers was the pushing of price main-
tained competitive articles, providir~ for special window and counter 
displays, special advertising, and sellir€ effort. Non-price maintained 
products of some manufacturers as well as products not yielding satis-
factory retail margins were placed "under the counter" or rroff the shelf. rr 
Lists of those manufacturers who entered into resale price mainter~nce 
contracts were distributed to retailers encouraging retailers to push 
the product of the listed manufacturers. In every instance, the National 
Association of Retail Druggists either recom~ended or irdtiated the cam-
paigns that were used. 
Unlike the trades previously discussed, the drug trade was 
orgardzed so that every drug retailer was erJisted to cooperate with 
promotional activities established by state "fair trade committees." 
This militant effort on the part of such committees has meant the dif-
ference between the limited application of price maintenance, common to 
the other trades, and the success of its application in the drug trade. 
Not only did these committees distribute price mainter~nce ar~ price 
• sheets, but also took it upon themselves to police retailers to see that 
there were no violations of price contracts. Their policywas to instruct 
retailers not to sign price contracts until they had been approved by 
the committee. 
In most states these committees obtained funds from manufacturers, 
wholesalers and retailers for carryir~ on their activities. Some commit-
tees charged manufacturers a definite sum of money for each service ren-
dered, such as the printir~ and distribution of contracts, of price lists, 
or of price char~es. Some of these charges ran as high as eight or 
nine hundred dollars each year. It is evident that manufacturers would 
have to be under substantial pressure to succumb to such charges.* 
Encouraged by these committees, retailers could exert such pressure by 
virtually boycottir~ non-price ~intained items. While it is reasonable 
that retailers and wholesalers should contribute to groups representing 
them, it is hardly reasor~ble that manufacturers should be coerced into 
doir..g so. Although the amounts contributed by manufacturers was generally 
relatively small, it is obvious that. the consumer would ultimately make 
up for this expense. 
2. Benefits to Fair Trade Manufacturers 
By cooperatir~ with the fair trade committees, manufacturers 
have been benefited to the degree that drug retailers are more prone to 
aggressively promote the manufacturer~ price maintained products. In 
1938, for instance, a group of dentrifice manufacturers met to discuss 
means of promotir~ their r~tior~lly advertised products. Sponsered by 
Drug Topics, a drug trade magazine with r~tior~l circulation, this 
publication encouraged druggists to push price maintained products 
during Natior~lly Advertised Brands Week. According to Drug Topics, 
Natior~lly Advertised Brands Week was a great success. By their own 
survey, 70.8 per cent of all the druggists in the Ur~ted States installed 
the Brands Week trim in their stores.* It was reported that an average 
sales increase of 14.7 per cent was reco~ded for 9,042 druggists. Ac-
cordir~ to this publication, the success of this campaign was instrumental 
in attracting some 140 manufacturers to issue fair trade contracts on 
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additional drug items.iHf. The success of· this campaign gave impetus to 
other campaigns with different names, but with the same objective, to 
prove to manufacturers that price maintained products would show the 
greatest volume increase in sales. 
In a sense, the promotional campaigns sponsored by drug trade 
journals enlistir€ the cooperation of druggists throughout the country, 
could be classified as pressure tactics. It is a case of either main-
taining the price of drugs or be boycotted by local druggists. On the 
other hand, a manufacturer has the alterr~tive of doir~ his own promotion-
al work by aggressive r~tior~l advertisir~·· It is evident, however, that 
the cost of goir~ it alone would, in many instances, be prohibitive. 
There is also nothir~ preventir~ a group of manufacturers from formir€ a 
voluntary association with the purpose of runr~ng a group campaign. 
Offering a wider margin of profit to both the wholesaler and retailer 
would perpetuate its own promotion. In.short, there is nothir~ to pre-
vent manufacturers from by-passir~ the pressures of the drug trade. The 
fact is, however, that a good proportion of the drug manufacturers have 
benefited from resale price maintenance. It is improbable that their 
products are priced higher because of a maintained price and it is cer-
tainly less expensive to enlist the aid of fair trade committees ar~ 
drug journals thar. to promote the campaign by themselves. Not only do 
manufacturers benefit from an increased sales volume but also the profit 
that accrues from reduced expenses. In the long run this would seemir~ly 
more than make up for the charges that are made by the committees for 
financir~ their actiwities. 
~Hf. 12, PP• 3 
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III PRICES AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
One of the most persuasive arguments posed by opponents of 
resale price maintenance is that price maintained products cost the 
consumer more than if they were priced competitively on a non-price 
maintained basis. In many cases, this would certainly be true. It is 
quite obvious from the foregoir~ discussion that chain, as well as cer~ 
tain large retail orgar~zations would be able to sell r~tior~lly adver-
tised brands at lower prices than they could be offered by the average 
independent store. Proponents of resale price maintenance point out, 
however, that without minimum resale prices the field of retail dis-
tribution will be monopolized by chains and department stores. The big 
store, they say, would quite naturally promote price wars on branded 
products ar~ gradually force neighborhood stores out of busiress. Chains 
and department stores can easily make up on non-fair traded jewelry, 
carpets, hardware, sporting goods, shoes and clothir~ what they lose on 
trade marked goods. It is said that· stores like Macyts, a large depart-
ment store in New York City, has only ten percent of its stock composed 
of fair traded items. In mar~ instances, however, the items composing 
this ten per cent might constitute as high as eighty per cent of a smaller 
stor~ts sales volume.* It is for this reason that proponents of fair 
trade contend that maintained prices have been responsible for keeping 
the little independent business in existence. 
A. Price Comparisons 
For some urJmown reason, considering the heat of the contro-
versy over resale price maintenance, relatively little statistical proof 
has been offered by either faction to back up their contentions relative 
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to the effects of fair trade on retail prices. Macy1 s made a "thorough 
investigation of the effects of these fair trade laws upon retail prices." 
Its surv~ of over 4,700 items showed that cosmetic prices were raised 
8.5 per cent; drugs, 16.0 percent; liquors, 11.8 per cent; books, 
17.6 per cent; and miscellaneous items, 15.8 per cent.* A year later, 
in 1939, a study made in Michigan showed that in cut-rate drug stores, 
prices of typical proprietary drug items under fair trade contracts in-
creased 15.7 per cent to the consumer while "typical" non-fair trade 
items declined 3.3 per cent.** It must be pointed out that these inves-
tigations show the difference between what would ur1doubtedly be so-called 
ttlos_s leaders" and the maintained prices established by the manufacturer. 
These figures also indicate the difference in selling price that they 
would be offered in a small independent store as opposed to a large store 
such as Macyrs. The Michigan survey, in fact, states that the figures 
were obtained from cut-rate drug stores. This should not be considered 
in defense of fair trade but-merely an indication of the danger of judging 
these comparative figures on their face. The question here is not whether 
price maintained items could be found in non-fair trade states at a lower 
retail price. More important, it is _whether price maintained items are 
priced higher than they were in the small independent stores before being 
price maintained. The objective of resale price mainter~nce is not to 
gouge the consumer or to increase the retailerst margin, but rather, to 
protect the business of small retailers who do not have the capital re-
serves to get into a price war with their larger competitors. 
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It must also be pointed out r~tior~lly advertised brands have, 
as a general rule, almost always brought a higher price at retail than 
private brands. It is characteristic of the market in every field that 
some products in that field will be marketed with an advertised aura of 
exclusive quality whether the distinctiveness is present or not. This 
will be covered more fully further on. 
In contrast to the case presented by the fair trade opponents, 
it is interesting to view the case presented by proponents of fair trade. 
It is naturally their contention that under price maintenance, prices at 
retail have been actually lower than in non-fair trade states. Senator 
Hubert H. Humphry, in his remarks recorded in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 
pointed to a survey made by A. c. Neilson C~mpany on comparative prices 
in fair trade and non-fair trade states.* In making this survey, 
A. C. Neilson Company 
••• put 1949 and 1951 price figures into IBM machines 
in order to ascertain what consumers in the 45 Fair 
Trade state·s, taken as a whole, paid for a list of 
the best knawn natior~l brand drug products as com-
pared with the price paid by consumers in Non-Fair 
Trade states for the same products. Overall, in 1949 
the consumer in Fair Trade states paid 1/lOth of a 
cent less, on the average, per product than did her 
Non-Fair Trade sister ••• 
The remarks go on to say, 
And in 1951 durir~ a six·month period, the Fair Trade 
states• consumer paid 1.4 cents less per product, on 
the average, than the Non~air Trade consumer did. 
Senator Humphrey goes or~ to point out that "these products went up 16.4 
per cent in price since 1939; the Consumer Price Index of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics shovred an increase of 90.2 per cent for the same period." 




In 1950, Seantor Humphrey referred to a study made for the 
Bureau of Education on Fair Trade. While an obviously,partisan group, 
their report is worth noting. It is a price survey which shows that 
fair trade stores offer lower retail prices to the consumer. (see tablec 
1)411- According to the table, of eighteen nationally advertised brands, 
the consumer paid les~ on twelve of these products in states with fair 
trade laws and slightly more for six. In reference to this study, the 
Bureau says that it 0 ••• shows conclusively that the protection of trade 
marks, ••• is achieved at no cost to the American people." 
The latest known study on the effect of fair trade on consumer 
prices was recently completed by Ward Bowman ar.d reported in the Swmner 
issue of the University of Chicago Law Review.** After a year in check-
ir€ retail prices all over the r~tion, the conclusion arrived at by 
economist Bowman is that in the forty remaining fair trade states, tooth-
paste, the product he selected as most typical, costs 2 per cent more 
than in non-fair trade states. 
There is considerable importance in Mr. Bowman's study since 
it actually coroborates the study for the Bureau of Education on Fair 
Trade. As stated before, consumers in the Bureau study paid slightly 
more for six of the eighteen r~tior~lly advertised brands in fair trade 
states. It will be noted that five of these six products that were 
priced slightly higher were classified as dentifrices in the table. By 
-.;,otaling the two price columns under dentrifices and dividing by six, the 
number of dentifrice products represented, it wtll be found that denti-
frices in fair trade states were also two per cent higher than in the 
non-fair trade states. Thus, these entirely independent studies appear 
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to agree in their findings. 
Table 1 Consumer Prices in Fair Trade and Non-Fair Trade Area~ 
-
__ J Brand Fair Trade Minimum · Consumer Price All Stores Price 




1 ~~0.43 $0.432 $0.416 
2 
·59 ./590 .586 
3 .43 .472 .438 
4 .43 ·439 .435 
5 ·53 .540 .534 




7 .23 .237 .238 
8 .29 .303 .322 
9 .31 .317 .322 
10 .36 .392 .421 
11 .39 .411 .439 





-57 ·574 .567 
14 .49 .503 .528 
15 .24 .256 .274 
I 16 .19 .216 .235 17 .59 ! .609 .622 
~ 18 .19 1 .209 .229 j 
# Includes data from 700 stores in 45 fair trade states and 70 stores in 
non-fair trade states.. Sample compos ed of independent and chain stores 
in both rural and urban areas. Similar types of stores were compared 
and prices weighted according to sales volume., Collected over two 
months period from July 15 to September 15 with September 1, 1949 rep-
rese~ting the average - average weighted to reflect volume. 
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It is unfortunate that Mr. Bowman's study did not include more branded 
items since it would have gone far to dispel doubts as to the coinciden-
tal nature of the foregoir~ findings. Furthermore, there is no possible 
way to project the results of either of the two studies in order to ar-
rive at a more encompassir~ determination of price differences, if ar~, 
between fair traded and non-fair traded products. 
One of the allegations propounded by opponents of resale price 
mainter~nce is that maintained prices provide a crutch for inefficient 
busir~sses without which they would be unable to stay in business. In 
a compar~on study to the study on price comparisons, the Bureau of 
·Education on Fair Trade compiled a study "which shows that drug stores 
in the 45 fair trade states - in the aggregate - have a lower operating 
cost than do those in the n.on-fair trade areas." (see table 2).* Ac-
cording to this study, operating expenses of fair trade states averaged 
26.17% of sales while comparable figures for stores in non-fair trade 
areas was 27.57% of sales. This would mean an efficiency differential 
of 1.4%. In considering this study it should again be pointed out that 
the source of this study would be questionably non-partisan. 
B. Costs and Prices--The Manufacturers' Peril 
The extreme paucity of studies on price comparisons between 
fair trade and non-fair trade items makes it impossible to arrive at 
any conclusive urnerstanding of the effect of resale price maintenance 
on r.etail prices. However, from a purely realistic standpoint it must 
be remembered that in a competitive market the consumer has a choice of 
both types of products and brarns amor~ these products. In short, the 
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Table 2 Summary Comparison of Average Operatir€ Data of 
Drug Stores in Fair Trade and Non-Fair Trade 
Classification 
In thousands of dollars 
-
Fair Trade Non-Fair Trade Combined 
Classification Classification 
No. of Stores 1,051 71 1,122 
Amount %of Amount % of Amount % of 
Sales Sales Sales 
Average Sales 
Volume Per Store 86.4 100.00 
v 
81.4 100.00 86.1 100.00 
•-:: ~ I 
Cost of Sales 58.3 67.46 54.8 67.26 58.1 67.44 
Operatir€ Expenses 22.6 26.17 22.4 27.57 22.6 26.25 
Net Profit 5.5 6.37 4.2 5.17 5.4 6.31 (Pretax) 
-. 
manufacturer of a product prices his product,at his own peril. It is 
for the manufacturer to decide what the public will bear ar~ he will 
set his minimum resale price accordingly. The retailer, in turn, in 
most instances, is forced to price his fair-traded items at the mirdmum 
price in order to be competitive. 
In recent years the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD carried a list of a 
few items showing the rar€e of prices at which various brands are offered 
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at retail.* Some of these are as follows: 
Silverware - 67 brands - from $21.50 to $69.?5 
Face Powder - 56 brands - from $.09 to $1.20 per ounce 
Laundry Soap Flakes - 51 ~rands $28.3 to $69.3 per 
ounce 
Cold Cream - 81 brands - $.04 to ~ 75 per ounce 
Ink - 27 brands $.04 to $.25 per fluid ounce 
Washir~ Machines - 31 brands - $92.95 to $399·95 
It is evident t~t the various brands are composed of varying degrees 
of ingredients, innovations and qualities but the manufacturer is the 
one to decide whether his particular product warrants the value he has 
attached to it in relation to his competi.tort s products of like quality. 
From that point on, it is up to the consumer to determine which product 
is the best buy. 
c. The Relationship of Advertising to Resale Price Mainter~nce 
Advocates of resale price maint~r~nce adamantly pursue the 
theory that manufacturers have the right to protect the value of their 
trademarks and brara names that are associated with their products. 
Their contention is that a manufacturer has invested money in developing 
and promoting identified products ar1d that this investment should be 
protected from price cutters who seek to exploit the good r~e attanhed 
to such products. By cuttir~ prices on r~me brands, price cutters can 
attract customers to their stores with these "loss-leaders.n 
Vlhile some manufacturers have been able to gain public accept-
ance of their product purely on its merits, with relatively little adver-
tisir~, the large majority of the branded products that are, or have 
been, price maintained have been quite e~ensively natior~lly advertised. 
It is in this respect that critics of maintair~d prices distinguished 
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private from branded items. Although a product may be composed of iden-
tical ir~redients arn of like quality, the consumer is conditioned to 
buy the branded item through constant exposure to costly advertisir€ of 
the product. All this results in advertised products being sold at re-
tail at higher prices than private brands. 
It should be emphatically pointed out that resale price main-
tenance is the result and not the cause for the high prices charged for 
nationally advertised products. It is more a by-product of a marketir~ 
practice that was initiated by manufacturers. However, the practice of 
promoting branded items developed_into a competitive weaponwhich ben~­
fited the fir~ncially. secure chains and had adverse effects on the small 
independent retail operator. Thus, it is-not the independent retailer 
who is to blame for the controversy over resale price maintenance, it is 
the manufacturers. The small independent found resale price maintenance 
as his means of defense in the fight between the high priced branded pro-
ducts and the large retailers who used these products as "loss-leaders.n 
If there is to be a defense of the practice of expendir~ con-
siderable sums of money on promoting branded products, it must be based 
on the objective of providing the consumer with a better product at a 
lower cost. Advertisir~ men maintain that this is the objective and 
that there is evidence all around us to attest to the fact that this 
objective has been achieved. Through adve~isir~, demand creation has 
provided the manufacturer with a larger market, permitting large volume 
production at lower unit costs which have been passed on to the whole-
saler and retailer in the form of higher margins and the cor£umer through 
lower prices. Advertisir~, they say, is responsible for the technological 
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advancements that have been made in modern iraustry. There is considerable 
merit to this argument, however; as in everything, excesses in advertising 
can defeat its efficacy. 
It is not my purpose to pass judgment on advertisir.rg practices 
that have become so characteristic of the marketing process. The advar.~­
tages and abuses of advertising will, for our purposes, have to remain 
moot. Its relation to resale price mainter~nce lies in its responsibility 
to share some of the abuse that has been heaped on the fair trade. Fair 
trade laws are, to my mind, a direct outgrowth of large scale advertising 
and even if the fair trade monster is killed, its parent will continue 
to plague the small retailer. 
Give-away programs, r~tional contests, full color page adver-
tisements are expenses to the manufacturer that must of necessity be re-
flected in the retail prices charged the. consumer for his products. 
While the large chains and.department stores raise a hue and cry over 
maintained prices on r~tionally advertised products, scarcely a word is 
said about the costs of advertising passed on to the cor£umer. The rea-
son, of course, is that they want to exploit natiorally advertised products 
by their use as "loss-leaders" and if prevented from doir.rg so, push their 
own private brands by showing the consumer how cheaply they can buy nor.~­
fair traded products. Either way the chains and department stores have 
a case. 
The manufacturer, on the other hand, argues with considerable 
merit that if he does not create demand for his products~ the jobber or 
even the retailer will have to. Another argument advanced by the manu-
facturer when his product must be handled on a small margin is based on 
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the conter,tion that it has a more rapid turnover than the less well known 
brar~s of the jobber or of other manufacturers. Since his products are 
in greater demand he contends that a given unit in stock nets a larger 
volume of sales. Table 3 illustrates the manufacturer's contention with 
turnover figures from the retail trade where the same argument arises. 
While these figures do not prove the manufacturer's case, it serves to 
point up the merits of one aspect of his argument. 
Table 3 Retail turnover of advertised versus non-advertised brands; 
independent drug stores.* 
Annual turnover - 1937 
Item Advertised Non-advertised Ratio 
brands brands 
Seltzer-aspirin • • 8.4 2.1 4.0 
Cleansir~ tissues • 8.3 4.4 1.9 
Oral antiseptics. • 4.8 1.6 3.0 
Razor blades ••• • 4.3 3·4 1 .. 3 
Dentifrices • • • • 3.5 2.1 1.7 
Deodorants. • • • • 3.3 1.9 1.8 
Cold remedies • • • 3.2 1.6 2.0 
Hand lotions • • • . 3.0 1.9 1.6 
Shaving creams • • • 2.5 1.7 1.5 
Face Creams • • • • 1.5 o.8 1.8 
It would seem that if we can justify the existence of a parent, 
manufacturer's advertisir..g in this case, we can justify its off-spring, 
resale price maintenance, or, at least absolve it for its reputed 
* 7 PP• 62 
responsibility for high retail prices. Representatives of the medical 
profession state that the principal reason manufacturers sell drug prod-
ucts under their own trade names or brands to restrict to themselves the 
benefits of their advertising and thereby obta.in for their products higher 
prices than they would get if sold in competition under nonprietary chemi-
cal names. The extreme difference in costs between proprietary and non-
proprietary r~mes was reported in 1928, 1929, and 1930 at meetir~s of the 
American Medical Association (Table 4).* 
Table 4 Difference between cost prices and sellir~ prices as reported 
by wholesalers for certain drug items handled under specified 
manufacturers' protected trade names, or brands, and for iden-
tical substances and quantities handled under their chemical 
names. 
-
Aver. cost to wholesalers Aver. selling price of 
wholesalers 
Article 
Mfr's Chemical % savin€ Mfr 1 s Chemical % saving 
brand rame chemical rame brand rame ~hemical name 
1 0.496 0.141 71.6 .623 .200 67.9 
2 .101 .046 54.5 .116 .062 46.6 
3 .320 .134 58.1 .387 .181 53.2 
4 .466 .124 73.4 .560 .153 72.7 
5 .245 .096 60.8 .290 .127 56.2 
6 1.000 .651 34.9 1.212 .822 32.2 
7 .637 .303 52.4 .719 .424 41.0 
8 1.436 .514 64.2 . 1-753 .697 60.2 
' 
* 24 PP• 54, adapted in part from table 18. See pages 55 to 76, tables 
19 to 28 for comparative prices and margins on drug arrl food products 
which further illustrates the difference between branded and non-
branded items. 
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Table 5 shows in another way wholesalers pay two to eight times more for 
identical quantities of the same substance when purchased under the manu-
facturerts proprietary aames as they would have cost had they been pur-
chased under non-proprietary chemical designations. Similar ratios are 
Table 5 Comparison of the Relative Prices of Identical Substances 
Sold Under Protected and Non-Protected Names 
Wholesale Druggists• Prices - May 1930 
Proprietary Non-Proprietary 
Phenacetin $ 0.63 oz Acetphenetidin 
Aspirin Bayer 0.85 oz Acetylsalicylic Acid 
Veronal 3.00 oz Barbital 
Veronal Sodium 3.00 oz Barbital Sodium 
Atophan 2.75 oz Cinchophen 
Duotal-Winthrop 1.07 oz Guaiacol Carbor~te 
Urotropin 0.60 oz Menthenamine 
Luminal 6.90 oz Phenobarbital 
Luminal Sodium 6.90 oz Phenobarbital Sodium 
Trional-Winthrop 1.90 oz Sulphonettylmethane 
Aristol~inthrop 1.80 oz Thymol Iodide 
Tolysin 2.25 oz Neocinchophen 
Total $31.65 Total 
The total cost of an ounce each of 
these substances under a protected 
r~me is. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The total cost of an ounce each of 
these substances under an unprotected 
• • 














r~me is • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ll.26 
The cost of the proprietary r~e to the 
consumer is • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • $26.39 
* 24. PP• 52. Similar comparisons of the type shown above, showed the 
consumer paying four times more for proprietary r~ed drugs in 1927 
and more than three times more in 1929. 
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to be noted respectir~ retail selling prices under proprietary brand 
names compared with selling prices under nonproprietary chemical desig-
r~tions. Drug items were chosen for this illustration for no other reason 
than the fact that the drug trade is recognized as the leadir~ and most 
active exponent of fair trade. As would be expected, much of the criti-
cism as well as studies have been made in the drug field and is there-
fore most likely area for comparison between the prices of fair trade 
and non-fair traded products. 
D. Private Versus Natior~lly _Advertised Brands 
Advertisir~ is the prime weapon manufacturers use as a means 
of promotir~ their products in effective competition vdth private brands. 
In most instances nationally advertised brands must rely on consumer orien-
tation or conditior~ng rather than price in order to compete with private 
brands. As was just shown in the precedir~ section, the price differential 
between private ar~ advertised brands is considerable and contrary to the 
pleadings of opponer~ts of resale price mainter~nce, this difference i:a 
price is not due to products being price maintained ur~ess, of course, 
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they are thinking in terms of using the advertised brands as "loss leaders." 
While it is true that private brands have become more popular with consum-
ers, it is due to the amount of publicity that fair trade laws have re-
ceived, leadir~ to the general belief that fair trade items are too high 
priced. They generally failed to consider the reason behind this. As 
stated previously, price maintenance is responsible for these high prices 
only to the degree that it prohibits exploitation of r~tior~lly advertised 
brands through their use as loss leaders. 
Small manufacturers have also benefited from this prohibition 
by permitting them to assume a competitive foothold in the market. While 
their product might bear a trade mark, their advertising is often so 
miramal that for all intensive purposes, it would be classified as a private 
brar~. Again, should large retail outlets be permitted to use natior~lly 
advertised brands as loss leaders, it would be difficult to them to get 
their product on the market to sell at a price which would provide a 
profitable return. 
While jobbers were ambivalent tow·erd resale price maintenance 
at its inception, they have found since that it has benefited them in a 
number of ways. Jobbers have lor€ branded many of the products they 
handle. It was a form of protection against relying too much on the 
manufacturers they represented. Manufacturers have increasingly taken 
ove~ many of the functions of the jobber with.the purpose of promotir~ 
their OWTl products •. In addition.to large scale r~tional advertisir~, 
many manufacturers send their own salesmen to the retailer to supplement 
the jobbers' sellir~ efforts. With the increase of goodwill for the 
manufacturer's products, the jobber reduces his own hold on retail dealers. 
This puts the jobber in dar.rger of allowir..g the manufacturer to control 
his operating methods or to eliminate the jobber entirely. 
Most important to the jobber is the extent of the manufactur-
er t s strength in establi sbing margins. Manufacturers who sell branded 
pro~ucts for which a stror~ demand has been developed may take advantage 
of the goodwill which ir~eres in their brands. If, however, the jobber 
has established his own brands, he is.in a better position to resist 
such acts. Resale price mainter~nce has done much to encourage the posi-
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-~ion of ~he jobber in much ~he same way i~ has benefi~ed ~he small manu-
fac~urer. His priva~e brand can more readily find on ma:rrke~ when priced 
wi~h or sligh~ly belmv ~he price main~ained na~ionally adver~ised brands. 
Na~urally ~he manufac~urer is aware of ~he ~hrea~ of priva~e 
brar~s. However, excep~ in ins~ances where undue pressure is exer~ed on 
him as we saw in ~h~ drug ~rade, he has ~he choice of whe~her he wan~s 
.his produc~s price main~ained or no~. In ~he food ~rade we saw that pri-
va~e brand competi~ion is ~oo acute ~o profitably maintain prices., In 
the drug ~rade ~here would appear to be three reasons for the small amoun~ 
of competition from private brands. First, the drug trade has aggressive-
ly assisted the manufacturer in the sale of price maintained products. 
The drug trade has openly expressed their desire for a ma~gin of 33 1/3 
per cen~ and have a better chance of achievir€ this objective by selling. 
produc~s a~ a high maintained price so that the manufacturer can afford 
~o allow them this margin. Second the very nature of drug items makes 
the consumer more recep~ive to paying high pri~es. Drug items, in most 
instances, deal with the physical well-beir~, either interr~lly or ex-
terr~lly, and people are less prone ~o hunt bargains even for such basic 
medicir~ls as aspirins. Third, the comparatively few manufacturers in 
the drug field and the limited competition that is a resul~ of this. 
The liquor trade is another area in which private brands have 
become more popular, particularly among lower income groups. As stated 
before, these private brands are often put out by distillers who produce 
popular na~ionally adver~ised brands as well. In doing so, they are as-
sured of gettir€ a portion of the market on all income levels. At the 
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same time, they achieve their objective of obtaining higher margins and 
maintair.d.r.tg the goodm.ll attendant to their natior...ally advertised product. 
The electrical appliance field has also become highly competi-
tive due to the entrance of many private brands in the field. Notable 
amor.tg these is the Sears Roebuck line which, in most ·instances, carry 
their own name brands on products manufactured by nationally known com-
panies marketir.tg price maintained products. Many large department stores 
have followed suit but at the same time continuing to carry price main-
tained appliances as well. 
While resale price maintenance was not ~esponsible for usherir.tg 
in private brands, the controversy it provoked tended to increase public 
awareness of their availability as more economical buys. If resale price 
maintenance has effected private brands, it has been for the good. Con-
sumer acceptance of private. brands will increase competition and thereby 
put fair trade laws to their severest test. In the trade areas where main-
tained prices continue to flourish it would appear reasor~ble to assume 
is where its protection is most needed. · 
E. Discount Houses 
Probably the most sigr.d.ficant effect resale price mainter~nce 
has had on the national marketir.tg scene is reflected in the rise of dis-
count houses throughout the country. There is no question but that dis-
count houses are a direct outgrmvth of fair trade laws and whose sir.tgular 
purpose is to by-pass the restrictions of resale price mainter~nce by 
providing ~ationally advertised trade-marked products considerably below 
the stipulated maintained price. Origir~lly formed to deal only in 
price-fixed merchandise, discount·houses have extended. their cut~price 
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operations to apparel and other types of goods that are rarely subject 
to price maintenance. However, the greatest volume of discount selling 
remains in lines that are fair traded, particularly household appliances. 
In New York, where discount retailers have gained their largest propor-
tions it is estimated that 95 per cent of all electrical appliances that 
moved across counters were sold at discount prices.?~ 
The impact made by discount houses on other forms of retailir~ 
became most evident in 1955. Department stores in New York and other 
cities attempted to compete on the same terms as the discount houses by 
slashing their prices on major appliances to discount level. This was 
in spite of the fact that they invariably took losses by having to con-
tinue their store services such as delivery and charge accounts. This 
price slashir~ by New York stores was, for the most part, done with a 
minimum of complaint from manufacturers. It illustrates one of the 
prime failings of the operative aspects of fair trade, that of enforce-
ment of its policies. The problem of enforcement will be covered further 
on. 
1. The Char~ing Character of the Retail Market 
If it is difficult for the reader to understand why fair trade 
manufacturers permit discount houses to sell their products, a look at 
the amount of business discount houses do should proVide the answer. It 
will also. brir~ to the fore an awareness that the character of the retail 
market is char€ir~ and the change is at a phenomenal rate of speed. 
From an indetermir~te begirudr€ some-twenty years a@o, it is 
estimated that today there are between 6,000 and 10,000 discount houses 
* 14, PP• 97 
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quoting percentages off list price throughout the count~. This is 
roughly eight times as many houses as before the war. In New York City 
alone, there are over 1,000 discounters as compared to 400 to 500 in 1951. 
Annaul natior.al sales volume of discount merchants is estimated by the 
U. s. Chamber of Commerce to be $50 billion dollars.~!- These figures are 
meaningless ur~ess compared to the r.atior~l retail sales total. Accord-
.. 
ing to Washington economists and electronic computers, American consumers 
spent $185 billion dollars for "purchases for all commodities sold at re-
tail in 1955."iHE-
While there is no cause to doubt the figures provided by the 
u. ·s. Chamber of Commerce, there is some question as to what the 5o 
billion dollar sales volume is comprised of. The r~tior~l fugures in-
elude automobiles, clothir~, food, furniture, as well as all other con-
sumer commodities bought at retail. Ur~ess we can assume the discount 
sales figure to :include automobiles, and automobile.accessories as well 
as the other major items that comprise a substantial portion of the rat-
ional retail sales figure, the discount figure becomes suspect. However, 
if discount merchants are to be classified as merchants selling at retail 
below the list price, whether organized as discount houses or not, then 
the figure could be considered plausible. 
The discount house, as one e:xpert put it, 11is merely the facade 
for off-list retailir~.u The examples, he points out are as follows: 
*19 
**18 PP• 12.3 
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1. There are 250,000 so-called "legitimatett 
retailers With a two-price system under 
which "club•1members buy at a discount. 
2. There are a million retailers and their 
families who buy at wholesale for their 
own use. 
6. 
There are several million retail ar~ 
wholesale employees and their families 
and friends who buy off-list of wholesale. 
There are five million factoryworkers who 
buy off-list through their unions or "clubs." 
There are two million federal, state, county 
·and city employees who have off-list ttclub" 
privileges. 
There are several million farmers who buy 
off-list.* 
With the foregoir~ in mind, it is reasonable to assume that the estima-
ted figure of 50 billion dollars represents discount merchants as dis-
tir~uished from discount houses. For all practical purposes, whether 
classified as discount houses or discount merchants, the extent of dis-
count sellir~ represents one of the major failings of fair trade. Dis-
count selling is price cuttir~, the evil which fair trade was designed 
to rectify. The only difference between price cuttir~ and discount sel-
lir€ beir€ that the latter is supposedly restricted from identifyir~ the 
brand of the discounted merchandise in any advertising. This limitation 
has done little to stem the phenomer~l growth of discount selling. 
2. Secret of Discount Sellir€ 
One of the biggest discount houses in New York City is Masters, 
Inc. Accordir€ to Stephen Masters, head ot ta;i,s.._c~iscount house, the prime 
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secret to the success of his 20 million dollar a year business is his 
low operating costs. Comparir..g his operating costs with those of the 
member stores of the National Retail Dry Goods Association it becomes 
apparant that the difference provides a good part of the answer to the 
secret behind his orgardzation's ability to offer merchandise at sub-
stantial discounts.iE-
Comparison of Operating Costs 
Items N.R.D.G.A. Masters, Inc. 
Salaries and Wages ••••• • • • 17.70% 
Store and Selling Expenses • • • • 6.50% 
Warehouse and Shippir..g • • • • • • 2.25% 
Office and General • • • • • • • • 4.45% 






According to these figures, a member store of the N.R.D.G.A. must pay 
$32.90 for every hundred dollars of sales it takes in. Masters, how-
ever, rir..gs up one hundred dollars worth of sales at a cost of only 
$11.20. 
If the figures provided by Mr. Masters are true, and there is 
no reason to doubt them, it is obvious that Masters, Inc. as well as 
other discount houses with operating costs equally as low, can operate 
their establishments on ver,v small margins. These small margir~, of 
course, are the reason behind the lower prices paid for merchandise pur _ 
chased in discount houses. Accordir..g to recent figures, department 
stores doing between 20 and 50 million dollars worth of business each 






with the N.R.D.G.A. figures of above shaw operating costs of 32.9%, there-
by providir€ a net operatir€ profit of 4.0%. Masters, Inc. can operate 
on a gross margin of 15.20% and still show the same net operating profit 
as the department stores. 
Interestir€ly, Mr. Masters claims with justifiable pride that 
his organization offers services equal to, and in some instances, better 
than those offered by many department stores. For example:* 
1. All merchandise is brand new ar~ sold in original 
factory-sealed cartons. 
2. Refunds or exchanges are allowed at any time up 
to 30 days, with no questions asked. 
3. In addition to the manufacturer's usual warranty, 
Masters furr~shes a one-year guarantee. 
4. A large service repair department is maintained 
on the premises. 
5. Masters makes home deliveries. 
6. Switch selling policies are forbidden. 
Masters, Inc. is probably no more typical of discount houses 
than Macy and Company is typical of department stores; however, it does 
ir~cate that fair trade might well have ushered in a new era in retail 
marketing. Just as manufacturers' advertising ar~ promotion of branded 
products brought us resale price mainter~nce, so has resale price.main-
tenance been responsible for the popularity of discount merchandising. 
In both instances, in most cases, the mar~acturers have stood to benefit. 
Ur~er resale price maintenance the goodwill and promotion of their prod-
ucts was maintained. Under discount 1Sellir€ their .g€X)dwill has suffered 
.. 
little ara their sales volume car~ot but have increased. Only rarely do 
manufacturers fail Do provide discount houses with their products which 
certainly indicates that impairment of their trademarks is not such an 
important issue after all. 
IV THE FUTURE OF RESALE PRICE MA.I'NTENANCE 
A. Problems of Er~orcement 
Retailers sellir~ products for less than the miramum prices 
named in resale price maintenance contra9ts are of two general classes. 
There are those retailers who are willir~ to increase their prices to the 
minimum without being forced to do so by legal action, and those who will 
not change their price policy unless forced to do so by legal action.* 
The first type included dealers who sell for less than the stipulated 
price because they are not ir~ormed or because of mistakes in pricir~ and 
those who while wilfully selling at lower prices for one reason or another, 
do not object to raising their prices when requested or when legal action 
is threatened. The secorn type consists principally of merchants who 
believe in price competition and whose business has been based on their 
reputation for low prices and want to maintain their freedom of action 
concerning the pricing of their products. This latter class will not 
rais~ its prices to conform to the contracted minimum ur~ess forced to 
do so b,y legal action. In this connection, it should be remembered that 
resale price maintenance contracts are usually entered into between the 
manufacturer and one dealer, or at most a few dealers, and that other 
dealers are notified of this action and of any subsequent price changes. 
The resale price mainter~nce laws of the various states are not 
wholly uniform in their provision as to who may prosecute dealers for 
selling below minimum resale prices. All of the laws, however, provide 
* 25, PP• 243 
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that legal action may be brought by any person damaged against any dealer 
selling below such minimum prices. The state acts are quite uniform in 
the wordir~ andintent of the non-signer clause following the clause 
origir~lly incorporated by amendment in the California act. The clause 
in the California act reads as follows: 
Willfully and knowir~ly advertising, offering for 
sale or selling any commodity at less than the price 
stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to 
the provision of section 1 of this act, whether the 
person so advertising, offerir~ for sale or selling 
is or is not a part to such contract, is unfair com-
petition and is actionable at the suit of any person 
damaged thereby.# 
Legal action against alleged offenders can be brought by one retailer 
against another retailer or by a manufacturer against a retailer. Some 
of the trades, particularly the drug trade, have set up state-wide organi-
zations consistir~ of retail dealers whose function is to check on prices 
and to attempt to have dealers sellir~ below minimum prices correct the 
situation. Failir~ to do so, the r~mes of the offending dealers are re-
ported to state committees or to the owner of the brand or trade-mark, 
sometimes both. In many instances the manufacturers themselves assume 
the responsibility for the policing as will be seen. 
1. Remedies and Per~lties 
Statutory provisions relating to remedies and penalties in the 
er~orcement of mir~mum resale prices vary from state to state. Some 
states call for injunctive relief as well as recovery of three times 
the actual damages from the defendent, if any are proved.* The Nebraska 
# Sec. 1, referred to in the quotation is that describing contracts de-
clared as not in violation of any law of the State. 
"" 25, PP• 75 
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act provides that any producer or wholesaler of an identified commodity 
may refuse to sell arq such commodity to any bUD.yer who fails or refuses 
to execute a contract establishing a minimum resale price or to observe 
the already existing mir.dmum prices previously contracted for. Wyoming 
not only provides for revocation of a permit to do business for violation 
of a resale price maintenance contract, but also provides for fir~s not 
to exceed $500 or imprisoriment for not more than one year of both. The 
Massachusetts law provides for a $50 fine payable to the Commonwealth. 
These examples show the wide range of penalties and remedies used to 
er~orce compliance with stipulated minimum prices. Most often the degree 
ar~ effectiveness of er~orcement is contir€ent upon the per~lties meted 
out by the individual state courts. 
2. The Prohibitive Cost o£ Er~orcement 
For the most part, the cost of policing ar~ attempting to enforce 
resale price mainter~nce has been the responsibility of the manufacturer. 
While retail dealers have the right to bring suit against other retail 
dealers for violation of a contracted mirilmum price, the cost to exercise 
this right is too great for the average retailer to bear even with finan-
cial support from state committees supportir€ fair trade. Of late, even 
manufacturers have come to the conclusion that fair trade er~orcement is 
costly not on~ from a standpoint of policing and legal action, but also 
because of decreased sales volume resulting from cutting off retail out-
lets that practice price cutting on their products. 
A recent blow to fair trade came wberl w. A. Sheaffer Pen Co. 
gave up its lor€ fight for price fixir€• Over the last two years Sheaffer 
spent $2 million and cut off some 700 dealers in its effort to police and 
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enforce its price policies. Not or~y was the cost high for the mechardcs 
of policir~ but also costly from a standpoint of decreased sales. Sales 
for the fiscal first half year endir~ August 31, 1955 were down 9.5% from 
1954's comparable period vdth earrdngs dropping 35%·* Westir~house 
Electric Corporation, recogrdzir~ the same cost prohibitions followed 
suit. The cost problem as well as some recent state court decisions ad-
verse to fair trade have caused a wave of defections. In Michigan, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed an earlier rulir~ that a state fair trade law 
could be er~orced only against those retailers who had signed fair trade 
agreements.** Toastmaster division of McGraw Electric Company, on the 
other hand, continues to be one of the most vigorous enforcers of fair 
trade in the country. This year it will spend $750,000 in just one of 
its departments to employ professional shoppers to report retailers who 
sell its appliances at below fair trade mirdmums and to brir~ price 
cutters to c9urt-.*** Or~y in two states has General Electric given up 
its fight to maintain prices on its products. In 'qoth Indiana and 
Michigan General Electric notified retailers of itssmall fair traded 
home appliances that it was abandoning fair trade within their borders. 
Recently the Supreme Court in Michigan reaffirmed an earlier rulir~ that 
a state fair trade law could be er~orced only against those retailers 
who had signed fair trade agreements. In Indiana a lower court decision 
declared the state fair trade law unconstitutior~l. R. c. Walton, 
General Electric fair trade section manager, made it clear, however, 
* 15, PP• 90 
iHI- Courts in Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia and Virginia have har.lCied 
down parallel decisions. 
~* 13, PP• 16 
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"that his company will return to fair trade in both states if and when 
their laws make the principle enforceable.rr In short, General Electric 
obviously feels that the cost involved in enforcing fair trade is worth 
it; that is, ir. those states where the courts uphold the non-signer 
clause. 
Whether the cost of policing retail dealers for violations of 
price fixing is really passed on to the consumer is a moot question. It 
would appear that the consumer would ultimately absorb the cost of such 
expenditures but there is no evidence to support such a contention. For 
instance, although General Electric probably spends millions of dollars 
among its various departments to police fair trade, how would one account 
for this organization t s recent· announcement th,,t prices on their ap-
pliances would be reduced 30%.~~ The week before this announcement con-
sumers paid 30% more for their General Electric appliances than consumers 
this week. What did this 30% represent, a high margin or recently lowered 
production and raw material costs? Was it, on the other hand, a desire 
· to meet competitive prices or to clear out their large dealer inventory 
which had not sold as they anticipated? My point is that that 30% rep-
resented somethir~ to General Electric which they feel they can do with-
out now ar~ still obviously shaw a profit for their stock holders. If 
the consuming public could buy General Electric products several weelcs 
ago and feel no qualms as to the nbuyn they were getting, it is of small 
consequence that the consumer is payir~ the pr.ice of enforcing fair trade 
in their purchases today. 
* 16, PP• 83 
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We can also reason that what is good for the manufacturer must 
be good for the customer since the customer keeps coming back for more 
and the manufacturer continues to grow larger. If fair trade is strenu-
ously supported by General Electric it must mean that the company has 
benefited from it. If the company has benefited it would mean that the 
consumer has continued to buy their appliances because or in spite of 
fair trade. Maybe due to fair trade, General Electric has been able to 
sell more appliances, thereby increareproduction, lower unit costs of 
production and provide the consumer with a better appliance at lower 
cost. If so, the consumer has benefited by investir€ in the cost of 
enforcir€ fair trade. As I stated before, it is a moot question when 
you attempt to find out who actually pays the cost of this enforcement. 
3. Is Fair Trade on the Way out? 
Opponents of fair trade have had some cheering news in recent 
months. In addition to Sheaffer Pen Co. arrl Westinghouse Elec~ric 
Corporation abandordngjkir trade, the court decisions in Michigan and 
Indiana have destroyed the only legal basis for enforcir€ an effective 
fair trade price policy. In these states not only General Electric but 
also Toastmaster division of McGraw Electric Co. and Sunbeam Corporation 
have joined the surrender and canceled all their fair trade contracts with 
retailers in these states. Previously, courts in Arkansas, Nebraska, 
Georgia, had handed down decisions paralleling those in Michigan and 
Indiar~, makir€ the non-signer clause of these fair trade laws legally 
enforceable.* 
* 15, PP• 90 
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Of considerable sigrdficance to the future of fair trade is the 
recent report submitted by the Attorney General1 s.National Committee to 
Study the Antitrust Laws. Its purpose, as expressed by President Eisenhower 
was to "provide an important instrument to prepare the way for modernizing 
and strengthenir~ our laws to preserve American free enterprise against 
monopoly ara ur~air competition."* This report, nearly 400 pages long, 
had this reconnner.dation to make with respect to fair trade:** 
The Committee acknowledges that •Fair Trade' 
er~ctments reflect some legitimate commercial aims. 
Natior~lly advertised and branded consumer connnod-
ities readily lend themselves to loss-leader and cut-
rate merchandisir~ that can impair substantial in-
vestments in business goodwill. Such marketing 
tactics may alienate established distribution chan-
nels whose appeal to consumers emphasizes attractions 
other than price reductions. •Fair Trade' pricir~ 
er~bles manufacturers and other brand or trade-mark 
owners to invoke prompt legal sanctions to check 
unwelcome promotional selling, thereby protectir~ 
•quality" items ftom debasement in the consumer'S 
mira. 
The Committee, however, does net consider tFair 
Trade' pricing an appropriate instrumentality for 
such protection. Since state enactments vest absolute 
discretion in suppliers for determinir~ the level of 
a •Fair Trade' price, the legislative price-setting 
authorization extends far beyond the essential guar-
antees of •loss-leadert control. An effective 'Fair 
Trade' system, moreover strikes not only at promotion-
al price cutting, but at all price reductions which 
pass to the consumer the economies of competitive 
distribution. 
The Committee's report goes on to say "On balance, we regard the 
Federal statutory exemption of 'Fair Tradet pricing as an unwarranted 
* l9 
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compromise of the basis tenets of Natior~l anti-trust poiicy.n For this 
reason they recommend repeal of the Miller-Tydings amendment to the 
Shermah Act and the McGuaire amendment to the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, thereby enabling states to legislate fair trade. 
To date, nothir~ has been developed in the Cor~ress which 
places fair trade in any imminent danger. According to Representative 
Emanual Celler of New York, "the climate of public opinion has not so 
changed as to endar~er fair trade." On the other hand, some 56% of the 
5,000 members of a panel maintained Qy Tide, weekly busir~ss magazine 
of the sales and advertising fields believe that fair trade will survive 
no longer than two years. Twenty-two % of the panel estimates fair traders 
remairdng in force for as lor€ as five years and the remaining 22% feel 
that fair trade will survive indefinitely.* 
The most crucial testir€ ground of fair trade is in the states 
1-
themselves. At the end of 1955, fair trade laws were in effect in forty 
states having 80 per cent of the countryt s population.** The highest 
' courts of Georgia, Arkansas and Nebraska, in addition to the already 
mentioned Michigan and Indiana, have ruled unconstitutior~l fair trade 
itself, or those fair trade provisions that bind retails~ to observe 
fixed prices even if they refuse to sign agreements with manufacturers.~P~~ 
The constitutior~lity of fair trade was upheld by the highest 
courts of Per~lsylvania, Terwessee, Louisiar~, ar~ Wisconsin. Legislatures 
of three states, Massachusetts, Perllisylvania and Delaware, defeated bills 
~~- 8, PP• 15 
-iHfo 18, pp. 97 
~.PA- 15' pp. 97 
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to repeal fair trade. In addition, during the past year the United States 
Supreme Court refused to hear a petition by Scbwegmann Brothers, a 
New Orleans supermarket, an arch opponent of fair trade. The store had 
questioned the constitutionality of the McGuire Act. 
At this point there· is no one who would attempt to prognosticate 
the £uture of fair trade. The issue has been activated in recent years 
with renewed determination by opponents of fair trade but their efforts 
have been'or~y nominally successful. If fair trade is to die, its death 
will probably be a slow one. In the meantime, economists, lawyers and 
businessmen will wonder what would really be the result of possible 
country-wide abandonment of fair trade. It is a mystery many people 
would like to solve. 
B. Alternatives to Resale Price Maintenance 
While no one would venture to say what the results of abolish-
ir~ resale price maintenance would be, the general co~nsus would agree 
~hat margir~l retail business operations which have survived solely 
through price protection would probably go out of business. The biggest 
problem would be how to protect the efficient small businesses who would 
be driven to the wall by cut-throat competition from big operations. 
In the event of the demise of legalized maintained prices, 
suggestions have been preferred as to possible alterr~tives which might 
serve the same purpose. One of these would be to select dealers who 
would maintain retail prices suggested by the manufacturer whether urrler 
contract or not. While this suggestion has merit, it is highly question-
able whether a voluntary agreement would be of much value when the com-
petitor down the street promotes a substitute product or a product from 
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a competitive manufacturer. Also, the major obstacle is inherent in this 
plan as in resale price maintenance. The problem of policing is still 
present, and, most important, the extreme peril the manufacturer places 
himself in by restrictir~ the distribution of his products. If discount 
houses are havir~ relatively little trouble getting trade marked brands 
in their store under resale price mainter~nce, they would have even less 
trouble were they not under fixed prices. The manufacturer must consider 
who can do the most for him and it is doubtful that it would be the small 
merchant. 
Another suggestion is that cooperative advertising funds be 
used to police prices. Again, ur~ess a manufacturer subscribes to fixed 
prices because he feels morally compelled to, it would be ur~rofitable 
for him to allot funds solely to police prices on his products. The 
fir~l suggestion is to assume some of the functions of the wholesaler and 
retailer. As in the previous suggestion, this operation would be costly 
for the manufacturer. It would also leave the manufacturer open·to a 
great deal of criticism from the wholesaler who already feels the manu-
facturer has assumed too much of their responsibilities. It would also 
be detrimental to the manufacturer to lose the goodwill of the wholesaler 
for fear that the wholesaler vdll push his owr1 private brands or those 
of a competitor. It is my feeling that in most instances manufacturers 
are not willing to spend the money on preserving the goodwill supposedly 
an integral part of their trademark. Manufacturers are primarily inter-
ested in increasing their sales volume and should fair trade die ar~ 
there is r~thing but a voluntary mear~ of maintaining prices on their 
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products, they will have little alterr~tive but to place their products 
on the market on the same basis as those that are not price maintained. 
1. Mir.d.mum Mark-Up Lawx 
Consideration given to the preservation of the goomvill attached 
to the trademark or brand name of a manufacturerts product should assume 
the most minor role when discussir€ price cutting. The primary task is 
to find a means to protect the efficient but small business against dev~ 
astatir€ price cutting by their larger competitors. In this respect 
serious consideration has been given to mir.dmum mark-up laws, popularly 
known as loss-leaders or loss limitation, as a possible alternative to 
fair trade.* 
In general, this type of legislation declares sales of merchan-
dise by wholesalers and retailers at prices less than those paid for the 
merchandise, plus the distributor's cost of operation, to be ur~awful. 
Most of the mir.dmum mark-up acts make sales below cost unlawful when made 
with the intent to injure competitors or to destroy competition. Since 
the acts do not provide for a defir~te state policing agency, this res-
ponsibility falls on interested dealer groups. 
At present, 31 states have loss-leader laws although in Michigan, 
New Jersey and Ohio these laws have been declared inoperative by the state 
courts.iHE- Most of the loss-leader laws fall into two general groups. 
The laws of 21 states aim to prevent the wholesaler or retailer from sel-
ling any item below the delivered cost to him, plus his cost of doir€ 
it- 9, PP• 1 
** 9, PP• 31 
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business. In this type of law, the cost of doing business, unless proved 
to be less, has stipulated minimum percentages as costs of the wholesaler 
and retailer. In the second type, the law stipulates that it is illegal 
to sell below the delivered cost plus the cost of doir~ business includir~ 
certain expenses enumerated in the act. These expenses include the fol-
lov;ing: wages and salaries, rent, ir.terest, sellir~, delivery, advertis-
ir~, accounting costs, depreciation, maintenance, losses, taxes, fees, 
licenses, and insurance. In this second type, merchants must prove their 
expenses if accused of selling below costs. In some of the states, how-
ever, a cost survey can be made by retailers in an area, and this data 
may be used as evidence of cost below which no retailer may sell his 
merchandise.-!~> 
Minimum mark-up laws commonly cover all types of goods, and 
several apply to manufacturers as well as to wholesalers and retailers. 
Their chief importance, for purposes of this study, has been in setting 
lower limits for retail prices. In coverir~ all classes of goods sold 
at retail they differ materially from resale price maintenance laws which 
cover only identified commodities. Also, whereas resale price maintenance 
is a vertical agreement, mirdmum mark-up laws work in a horizontal manner; 
all retailers being prohibited from selling below whatever base is estab-
lished. 
Grocery and tobacco retailers have been quite active in support 
of minimum mark-up laws and for good reason. In the grocery trade, as 
* 3, For a more complete discussion of mirdmum-m.ark-up laws. 
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has already been pointed out, resale price maintenance is not readily 
applicable due to the pressure of competition from non-branded food items 
as well as the fluctuatir~ prices.of food items. In the tobacco trade, 
with the large number of outlets that are well nigh impossible to police, 
resale price maintenance has not been found practical. Thus, in these 
two trades, particularly where there are so many small retailers, the 
minimum mark-up law has been a protection against their larger competitors 
from using branded items as loss leaders. 
One of the problems that has caused the greatest trouble with 
the er~orcement of mir~mum mark-up laws is the unclear interpretation of 
the laws as they relate to costs of operation. It is in this area that 
the above mentioned state courts have found the law to be inoperative. 
In states where the laws have been found to be operative, er~orcement 
rests on the action of the merchants themselves or their associations to 
brir~ violations to court. The drawback here is that these individuals 
or associations must be able to afford to bring ~iolators to court. Pen-
alties vary from mere "injunctive reliefu to fines which rar~e from $.5 
for the first offense up to $1000 and imprisor~ent up to one year, or both. 
The very fact that the mir~mum mark-up law has been mentioned 
as a possible replacement for resale price maintenance indicates that the 
cause of the small efficient businessman is tied up completely with the 
future of resale price maintenance. It would appear, in fact, that mir~­
mum mark-up laws possess all the ingredients for overcomir~ the claimed 
evils of price cutting without being subjectto the criticism leveled at 
price fixing. Since these acts oruy prohibit sales below cost, ar~ since 
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the cost provided by the acts should be below the actual cost of the 
goods plus the costs of sellir~, there should be little cause for objec-
tions from any source. If effective, they will set a base below which 
retailers know prices will not go thereby relieving them of the uncer-
tainty that prevails where there is no limit to the extent to vmich prices 
can be cut. At the same time the mir~um mark-up law does not protect 
the high cost, inefficient retailer from beir~ forced out of business, 
or prevent the consumer from obtair~r~ the benefit of the low prices at 
which low cost retailers are able to sell. 
The primary drawback of mir~mum mark-up laws is that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to establish the costs of selling an 
irrlividual item. Costs of sellir~ individual items in a single estab-
lishment may vary widely and yet these laws must, of course, be designed 
to apply average marketing costs to all items. In fact, selling products 
at different margins in order to present a better over-all selling policy 
is practiced by mar~ merchants. It is important that these irrlividual· 
differences be recognized and allowed for in order to avoid the cor~lict 
that would inevitably arise in the courts. While trial ar~d error is not 
to be condoned, this might be the course that must be taken in order to 
arrive at an equitable but effective cost of operation. 
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V CONCIDSION 
Fair trade is an anomaly among laws. Even though 45 states saw 
fit to pass fair trade laws, these laws continue to be contested in the 
various state legislatures and courts. Even the passage of Federal leg-
islation fails to lend any prestige to its presence. While a fair trade 
law might well have become law on its own merits, legislative strategy 
that was used to gain passage of the Miller Tydings Act does little to 
enhance its stature. The later fight in the Supreme Court and in the 
Congress durir~ the passage of the McGuire Act permanently branded fair 
trade as a highly doubtful contribution to our body of .laws. 
After a period of twenty five years, one would think that price 
maintenance would have resolved itself. Either the hew should have been 
found basically unsound from a legal standpoint or uneffective as an 
economic corrective. In actuality, fair trade or at least its non-si~ner 
provisions, has been found in some state courts to be unconsittutional. 
As to its effectiveness as a corrective economic measure few economists 
would agree. 
Those who oppose a fair trade say the ~loor on prices was all 
right during the depression of the thirties when buying power was limited, 
but that there is no room for price-fixing in the booming economy of 1956. 
This argument has substantial merit, except that it fails to take into 
account that loss leader merchandisir~ knows no economic seasons. Fair 
trade, while born during the depression was not conqeived to help correct 
a sagging economw. On the one hand it could be looked at as a means of 
keepir~ marginal businesses operating in a depressed economy. However, 
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~rom an economic standpoint this would be controverted since the desire 
would be to increase consumer consumption whether it took price cutting 
to achieve this end o~ not. In short, the basic reasons which inspired 
the original need ~or resale price maintenance is as prevalent in 1956 
as it was in 1931. It must be remembered that the teeth were put in 
~air trade in 195'2.when the McGuire Act was passed and 195'2 could hardly 
be considered a depression year. 
It is my thesis that the growth o~.r~tional advertising has 
been the primary cause o~ the ~air trade predicament. National brand 
advertisir~ has made the consumer brand conscious to the degree that it 
has caused the consumer to rely on the man~acturert sword that a branded 
product is superior to an unbranded product. The consumer, like Pavlov's 
dog, is cor1ditioned to salivate at the mere mention o~ a nationally ad-
vertised branded product. With such intensive advertising, the retailer 
increasir~ly finds himsell in the position of a mere order-taker. What 
was originally pre-selling has now become pre-conditionir~. Consumers 
have become fearful of buyir~ a product that does not bear a brand r~me. 
This ~aith in a manufacturer's product or possible fear in not buyir~ a 
branded product on the part of the consumer is what the man~acturer 
classified as his goodwill. 
The obvious outcome o~ mass pre-sellir~ of a product was the 
use o~ such a product as a "come-on" on the part of large department, 
drug and food stores who could afford to sell these pre-sold products at 
cost or less. Quite naturally the consumer would be attracted to these 
loss-leaders and would go to considerable inconver~ence to take advantage 
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of such offers. If other merchandise was bought in the course of shoppir€ 
for loss-leaders, this was, of course, to the benefit of the store involved. 
The average small merchant would suffer when he is financially unable to 
operate his business in the same manner. 
One of the fur1damental reasons for resale price mainter~nce is 
to prevent the deceptive practice of loss-leader merchandisir€• It is 
in r'elation to this purpose that resale price maintenance should be 
judged. There is no der~ng, however, that other motives lay behind the 
support given it qy certain trades. The drug trade, in particular, by 
its open declaration of its desire for a 33 1/3 per cent mark-up obvious-
ly considers resale price mainter~nce a healthy step toward achieving this 
end. Establishing minimum prices for_:this purpose cannot be condoned un-
less such a mark-up is necessary to achieve a reasor~ble profit. An eight 
to ten per cent net profit is not, to my mind, reasonable and for whatever 
contribution resale price maintenance makes to this, I have little sympathy. 
However, as has been pointed out, in few instances can the higher price 
of an item be blamed on resale price mainter~nce. True, should such an 
item be used as a loss leader than there would be a distinct price differ-
ence; however, this cost is minor when compared with the high cost of 
monopoly at the retail level. 
Resale price maintenance, by establishing a minimum price has 
supposedly served not oruy to keep the small efficient business in opera-
tion but at the same time has considerably hampered the growth of monopo-
lies within the trades. I feel there is considerable merit in these sup-
positions. Competition, regardless how healthy it is for the economy, 
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can have detrimental consequences when carried to extremes. The main 
point to consider is that loss-leader merchandisir€ is not considered 
a good practice and that should £air trade £all by the wayside, other 
alterr~tives should be considered to prevent reoccurance o£ this evil 
on a grar~ scale. 
The main consideration in discussir€ maintained prices is 
whether £air trade has in actuality resulted in higher prices to the 
consumer. Frpm the available information, it is highly doubt£ul that 
maintained prices have caused high prices to the consumer. As was 
pointed out previously, the manu£acturer must establish a minimum price 
on his products which are in line with those o£ his competitors or sub-
stitute products. Also, it can be assumed that since many o£ the larger 
manu£acturers are in accord with resale price mainter~nce, they must £eel 
they derive some bene£it. This bene£it could hardly be in higher margins 
since not or~y must their prices be in line with competitor's but the 
£act that discount houses sell their products at lower prices must mean 
that their margins are not so high as to lead discount houses to carry 
private brands in order to advertise low prices. 
Manufacturers have ur~oubtedly £our~ that by cooperatir€ with 
the small dealer he can gain not only the small dealers' business but 
also that o£ the larger retailer. Should he cater or~y to the large .re-
tailer, he would be subjectto pressures £ar in excess o£ those exerted 
by the £air trade committees in the drug trade. Fir~lly, the manu£acturer 
in thirJdr€ in terms o£ his costs o£ production, must think in terms o£ 
his sales volwme. It would seem obvious, there£ore, that when a manu£ac-
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turer decides to fair trade his product he is thirJdr~ in terms of his 
sales volume as well as his per unit costs of production. If his sales 
volume is high, he benefits not only from increased sales but also lower 
production costs. 
~As far as protectir€ a manufacturer's goodwill, I feel fair trade 
has very little effect. It is highly questior~ble that the reputation 
of a manufacturer suffers when his products are used as loss-leaders or 
carried by discount houses. The only way his prestige would suffer 
would probably be the scepticism it might arouse among the public with 
respect to the price differences between a discounte~ price and that 
charged by a retailer operating on a reasor~ble margin. The public 
might consider the discounted price to be the actual worth of the prod-
uct, not in terms of quality, but rather with respect to what they consider 
to be a fair price. While price discrepancies among dealers might re-
flect poorly on the manufacturer, tfue fact that discount houses do not 
lack for nationally advertised brands to sell hardly substantiates this 
~oint. 
One of the more interesting aspects relative to the extent of 
the application of resale price maintenance is the relatively few price 
maintained products which are considered necessities of life. The food 
trade in particular has not lent itself to the application of resale 
price maintenance. The electrical appliance field and the drug trade, 
however, are the strongest bastions of resale price mainter~nce. The 
sigrdficance seems to be that maintained prices best lend themselves to 
products where there are few manufacturers within the field and where 
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these manufacturers have ~nsistently alligned themselves as beir€ sym-
pathetic with resale price mairlter.~B.nce. Irl the drug trade, as was pointed 
out, ·drug manufacturers have for years, even before fair trade, priced 
their branded products far beyond the prices charged for private brands 
though composed of the same ir€redients. In the case of the simple aspir-
in, the price difference between private brands and the nationally adver-
tised brands is appalling. Again, by way of extensive advertising or what 
I call consumer conditiordng, the drug manufacturer successfully creates 
the impression that his product is superior. The public, in most ir~tances 
succumbs to the conditiordng particularly where drugs are concerned, since 
they will not risk their physical welfare for the sake of a few penrdes. 
The discounter probably owes more to fair trade than does any-
one else. It gives him a fixed ceilir€ and makes it a simple matter for 
him to undersell those who are bound by fair trade contracts. It also 
makes it easy for consumers to compare his discount prices with prices 
fixed by fair trade while merchants with maintained price contracts are 
lacking the flexibility to meet his prices. It may be that the elimina-
tion of fair trade would hamper the operations of discount houses and 
discount merchants to a greater extent then it would hurt those who have 
so earnestly sought the protection of resale price maintenance. The re-
tailer who has found a way to make a profit by ur~ersellir~ his competi-
tors finds high mark-up, price-fixed, r~tionally advertised, ar~ thereby 
pre-sold goods particularly susceptible to discount sellir~. 
There is no question that retailers who are bound b,y ir~lex­
ible pricing contracts are findir€ the competition pair~ul. Even more 
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so if the retailer does not want to be party to the contract. There is 
no question but that it is inequitable that the large department stores 
must be bound by fair trade contracts when the discounters are not. On 
the other hand, it must be considered that the discounters have not been 
accused of the deceptive practice of loss-leader merchandisir€• The 
only accusation which can be leveled at them is that their prices ralect 
efficient operation and keen competition. 
Resale price mainter~nce has not failed in its original purpose 
of discouragir€ loss-leader merchandising. No doubt resale price main-
ter~nce has been responsible for protecting efficient but small retail 
operations who would have otherwise beer. driven to the wall by cutthroat 
competition from big, more fir~ncially secure stores. However, whatever 
useful purpose resale price maintenance has served, it has, to my mind, 
outlived its usefulness. Over recent years there has developed in this 
country an attitude toward fair trade like that toward prohibition in its 
last-days. Er~orcement of resale price maintenance has alone posed greater 
problems than could have origir~lly been considered. Not only is er~orce­
ment expensive for those who seek to eriforce it, but also expensive in 
terms of the time involved in the courts through repeated litigation. 
As was stated previously, resale price maintenance lends itself 
to products where there are a few manufacturers within a field and where 
these manufacturers are.in closely associated trade groups. This beir€ 
the case, resale price maintenance does not increase "fair" competition 
but in actuality stifles it. The biggest test for resale price mainten-
ance is iri areas where there is a great deal of competition and it is 
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in these areas it does not flouish with any vigor, if at all. Commodit-
ies to which resale price maintenance is moat extensively applied are 
those possessing distinctive characteristics in the minds of customers. 
Amor~ these are proprietary articles producted under secret formulas or 
urlder the protection of patents or copyrights so that the manufacturer 
can determine whether there shall be duplicates of them on the market. 
The others are the r~tionally advertised brands that have become so im-
pressed on the consumers' mind that there has developed a belief that 
these products are superior to less well-known competing brands in 
quality, construction or performance. In actuality, many of these less 
well-knowr1 commodities are put on the market by the manufactuers of the 
natior~lly advertised brands and many times being of equal quality. The 
question is whether the public has become aware of this hoax in the past 
twenty-five years. If not, loss-leader merchandising will again occupy 
the forefront much to the detriment of the small businessman.· The only 
test as to the effectiveness of the resale price maintenance will come 
when it is too late; when it is no longer in force ar~ the same problems 
it was to have overcome have again arisen~ 
The classical economic concept of the self-adjustir~ economy 
is no lor€er considered seriously. To be preserved, competition has to 
be contro~led in order to maintain balance within the economy. Resale. 
price maintenance may not be one of the means with which to control it 
but ur~il a better way is discovered, it should not be prematurely des-
troyed. Serious discussion should be had on the merits of the mirAmum 
mark-up laws which might well make an apt r~cement for resale price 
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maintenance. Such a law would serve the dual purpose of permittir.g 11fair" 
competition and at the same time prevent the unrestricted practice of 
loss-leader merchandisir€• Every precaution should be taken to see that 
it is equitable with respect to all business and manufacturir.g interests 
and at the same time with clear provisions for er~orcement of violations 
of the law. Fir~lly, it would be my suggestion that manufacturers be re-
quired to make public all brands of the products they manufacture whether 
distributed under their advertised brand or under a retailers or whole-
salers brand. This requirement would go a long way toward rectifyir€ 
the problem that resale price mainter~nce was origir~lly assigned to 
correct. It would tend to equalize the competitive position of mar~ 
private brands with that of the natior~lly advertised variety. 
While I am in sympathy with the problem which resale price 
maintenance sought to correct, its questionable inception and its 
seemingly tenuous future provides justification for serious consider~tion 
of its repeal not only amor.g the states but also at the.Feder~l level 
as well. Resale price maintenance will continue to be too controversial 
to be effectively workable and in this respect does not serve the pur-
pose for which it was designed. In a democracy the people decide whether 
r 
i 
It is hoped that future legislation considered in 
! 
a law is workable. 
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